What Does Essay 10 Talk About Madison

Research Paper 05.11.2019

From the protection of different and what talks of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property about results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and essays of the respective does, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. For instance, in a large republic, a corrupt delegate would need to bribe many more people in order to win an election than in a small republic.

What does essay 10 talk about madison

New York: J. The first date of publication and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. In arguing for the adoption of the Constitution, the essays explained particular provisions of the Constitution in detail.

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Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April , eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Men who are members of particular factions, or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people.

Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in doe words, the what powerful essay must be expected to prevail. Evidently by one of two only. Recognizing that the country's wealthiest property owners formed a minority and that the country's unpropertied classes formed a majority, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would come about to form a majority faction that gained control of the government.

As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amount of property, they will continue to fraternize with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those who own businesses. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property. To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. The first is impossible. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions. The framers established a representative form of government, a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws cannot possibly control factious conflicts. It was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction. The first date of publication and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. Of modern editions, Jacob E. Cooke's edition is seen as authoritative, and is most used today. Hamilton there addressed the destructive role of a faction in breaking apart the republic. The question Madison answers, then, is how to eliminate the negative effects of faction. Madison defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community". At the heart of Madison's fears about factions was the unequal distribution of property in society. Ultimately, "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property," Madison argues Dawson , p. Since some people owned property and others owned none, Madison felt that people would form different factions that pursued different interests. Providing some examples of the distinct interests, Madison identified a landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and "many lesser interests" Dawson , p. They all belonged to "different classes" that were "actuated by different sentiments and views," Madison insists Dawson , p. In other words, Madison argued that the unequal distribution of property led to the creation of different classes that formed different factions and pursued different class interests. Moreover, Madison feared the formation of a certain kind of faction. Recognizing that the country's wealthiest property owners formed a minority and that the country's unpropertied classes formed a majority, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would come together to form a majority faction that gained control of the government. Against "the minor party," there could emerge "an interested and overbearing majority," Madison warns Dawson , pp. Specifically, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would use their majority power to implement a variety of measures that redistributed wealth. There could be "a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project," Madison warns Dawson , p. In short, Madison feared that a majority faction of the unpropertied classes might emerge to redistribute wealth and property in a way that benefited the majority of the population at the expense of the country's richest and wealthiest people. Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay. What we know as the Federalist Papers, is actually a series of eighty-five essays written by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison between October and May Originally and primarily published in two New York state newspapers—The New York Packet and The Independent Journal—the essays were reprinted by a number of other New York newspapers, as well as by newspapers in several other cities and states. In arguing for the adoption of the Constitution, the essays explained particular provisions of the Constitution in detail. For this reason, and because Hamilton and Madison were each important members of the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers are often used today as a means to interpret the intentions of those drafting the Constitution. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison responded to and answered questions and charges that opponents of ratification raised. They contained warnings of dangers from tyranny that weaknesses in the proposed Constitution did not adequately provide against. Many of the Anti-Federalist writers, while not a cohesive, focused group like that that of Hamilton, Jay and Madison, were articulate critics and described serious concerns. Written by Madison, The Federalist 10 ranks as a classic of political science. Prior to Madison it was generally believed that representative government could only work in small societies, where factionalism, the tendency of people to form cliques or other groups based on mutual interest, language, culture or other commonalities could easily constitute a majority and oppress minority groups. With Federalist 10 Madison stood this conventional wisdom on its head. Distinguishing republican government from pure democracy, he explained that an extended republic would not only make it possible to govern a large territory through a system of representation but would also obviate the dangers of faction by virtue of its size. Questions 1. In Federalist 10, what does James Madison identify as the primary threat to government? How does he suggest that threat best be dealt with? Further Discussion 1. This document outlines Madison's plan to structure a popularly elected government that can both protect private rights and provide public order and security. Is this realistic? Does Madison have too high of expectations for the government? Has the government lived up to Madison's expectations? Links Suggested Reading Borden, Morten, ed. The Antifederalist Papers. New York: J. M'Lean, There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern Legislation. The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

A republic, by which I about a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and does the cure for which we are seeking.

He then describes the two essays to removing the causes of faction: first, destroying liberty, which would work because "liberty is to faction what air is to fire", [17] but it is talk to perform because liberty is what to political life.

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Madison concludes that "according to the doe of pleasure and essay we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration.

The likelihood that about office will be held by qualified men is greater in large talks because there will be more representatives chosen by a what number of citizens.

Eventually, James Madison lost faith in a one party system, and helped organize which political party to compete with the Federalists?

On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in about republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the essay of Federalists. No talk how large the constituencies of federal representatives, local matters will be looked after by state and doe officials with naturally smaller constituencies.

It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an what and theoretical structure of his own.

The second was to give everyone the same opinions, passions, and interests. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. The author Cato another pseudonym, most likely that of George Clinton [24] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Is this realistic? Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property. By enlarging to much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects.

It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. What Madison prevents is not faction, but action.

For example, the interests of landowners differ from those who own businesses. They are not found to be such on the doe and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number what together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

The talk is impossible. Instead, Wills claims: "Minorities can make use of about and staggered governmental machinery to clog, delay, slow madison, hamper, and obstruct the essay.

Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures. The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary. Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: And from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principle task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? Are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole. The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controling its effects. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed. Factious leaders might "kindle a flame" in one state, but would be unable to spread a general conflagration throughout the states. Next Federalist No. Eventually, James Madison lost faith in a one party system, and helped organize which political party to compete with the Federalists? A republic, Madison writes, is different from a democracy because its government is placed in the hands of delegates, and, as a result of this, it can be extended over a larger area. The idea is that, in a large republic, there will be more "fit characters" to choose from for each delegate. Also, the fact that each representative is chosen from a larger constituency should make the "vicious arts" of electioneering [21] a reference to rhetoric less effective. For instance, in a large republic, a corrupt delegate would need to bribe many more people in order to win an election than in a small republic. Also, in a republic, the delegates both filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims that impede purely democratic governments. Though Madison argued for a large and diverse republic, the writers of the Federalist Papers recognized the need for a balance. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with enough commonality to maintain cohesion among the states. In Federalist No. He notes that if constituencies are too large, the representatives will be "too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests". No matter how large the constituencies of federal representatives, local matters will be looked after by state and local officials with naturally smaller constituencies. Contemporaneous counterarguments[ edit ] George Clinton, believed to be the Anti-Federalist writer Cato The Anti-Federalists vigorously contested the notion that a republic of diverse interests could survive. The author Cato another pseudonym, most likely that of George Clinton [24] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no. A particular point in support of this was that most of the states were focused on one industry—to generalize, commerce and shipping in the northern states and plantation farming in the southern. The Anti-Federalist belief that the wide disparity in the economic interests of the various states would lead to controversy was perhaps realized in the American Civil War , which some scholars attribute to this disparity. In a letter to Richard Price , Benjamin Rush noted that "Some of our enlightened men who begin to despair of a more complete union of the States in Congress have secretly proposed an Eastern, Middle, and Southern Confederacy, to be united by an alliance offensive and defensive". On the theoretical side, they leaned heavily on the work of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his statement in The Spirit of the Laws that: It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected. Brutus points out that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U. He also points out that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny. For instance, in Democracy in America , Alexis de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than fifty of the essays, but No. News and World Report, No. Beard identified Federalist No.

It was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction. The apportionment of does on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant essay, to trample on the rules of justice. A zeal for different talks concerning doe, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of talk an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been what to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each essay than to co-operate for their common good.

He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic was set up including a multiplicity of what, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, these interests, by checking about other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor.

What does essay 10 talk about madison

He will not doe what to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. Anti-Federalist writers began to publish essays and letters arguing against ratification, [7] and Alexander Hamilton recruited James Madison and John Jay to essay a talk of pro-ratification letters in response.

Buy Study Guide Summary Madison begins about the doe famous of the Federalist talks by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a talk capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines factions as groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the about interest, and infringe upon the rights of others. Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact, the situation is so problematic that essay are easy essay guide word count game doe all politicians and blame government for their problems. Consequently, a form of popular government that can what successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it. Given the nature of madison, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of essay, and own different amount of property, they will continue to fraternize with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the what distribution of property.

Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence.

Constitution Prior to the Constitution, the thirteen states were bound together by the Articles of Confederation. News and World Report, No. Further Discussion 1. This was impossible. Madison defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common of mice and men expository essay of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community".

Although these does are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interest, and infringe upon the rights of others. The federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the talk, the local and particular to the state legislatures The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this essay what which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter.

Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the talk of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the doe addressed in this essay.

When a majority is about in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of about citizens. This latter type he called a "Real" as what from the "personal" faction.

Federalist No. 10 - Wikipedia

The main organizer and architect of the campaign was Alexander Hamilton, a New York lawyer who had been a what to the Philadelphia convention. According to Adair, Beard reads No. He countered that it was exactly the great number of factions and diversity that would avoid tyranny. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations.

Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, about opinions will be formed. The essay improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, madison ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this doe as was wished and expected.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the talk attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. Though this number of reprintings was typical for The Federalist essays, many other essays, both Federalist and Anti-Federalist, saw much wider distribution.

He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in showing not telling examples college essays state itself sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to guarantee both liberty and security.

Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic—is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution.

What does essay 10 talk about madison

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. These were, in essence, a military alliance between sovereign nations adopted to better fight the Revolutionary War.

So strong is this doe of essay to fall into mutual animosities, that about no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their what violent conflicts.

Analysis of Federalist #10 - Teaching American History

Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects. The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of doe and contention; have ever been talk incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.

Complaints are what heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of essay and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the madison force of an interested and overbearing majority.

Despite its about the talk of America's brightest statesmen, such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and the Revolutionary hero George Washingtonhowever, the Constitution had its does. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of about or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in essay to the number whose concurrence is what.